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Guatemala, the most populated State in Central America with 15.7 million people and 3,340 
USD$ GNI per capita in 2013, is an example of early spectrum management liberalization. The 
enactment of the General Telecommunications Law in 1996 in Guatemala was a milestone in 
that country’s spectrum management. It had big implications also for other developing countries 
as Guatemala was one of the first countries to move in the direction of market mechanisms, 
including auctions, for allocating spectrum. Article 54 states that any person or company might  
request  the  right  to  use a  non-previously allocated  spectrum  band.  The petitioner shall 
participate in a public tender to obtain a license “Título de Usufructo de Frecuencias” (TUF), 
and once the license is granted, the licensee has the right to determine the service and technology 
to implement. Bands can be leased, sold, or subdivided during the period of time set forth in the 
license and the only restrictions imposed, are the frequency range, the maximum power 
transmitted in the band and at adjacent bands, the geographic scope, and license duration.  
Although not all frequency bands are available within this model—some are reserved for public 
services and the radio amateur service—a big portion of the useable radio spectrum is now 
allocated under this regime in Guatemala. The regulator “Superintendencia de 
Telecomunicaciones (SIT)” is responsible to enforce the rules and to solve any dispute over 
the rights of use that interferences might cause. 
 
At the time, this approach to spectrum management was revolutionary, since the common 
practice for allocating frequencies was normally the opposite: the regulator specified in a 
license the service and technology to be used in each frequency band, and any change to these 
conditions was not allowed without prior regulator’s approval. 
 
The idea behind the Guatemalan case, however, is not new; as early as 1959 Ronald Coase 
(1959, 1960) pointed out that a regulator allocating the spectrum would face the problem of 
efficiently assign the frequencies without reliable information on the market value of the band 
and consumer preferences. Furthermore, the regulator would be subject to political pressure, 
thus making allocations potentially inefficient. 
 
Notwithstanding, there are powerful arguments for regulating spectrum allocations as a scarce 
resource. These stem from the likelihood of interference between radio communication 
services, economies of scale, externalities linked to some of the commercial services using the 
spectrum, the existence of services which may be considered pure public goods, along with 
conditioning factors linked to the legacy usage of spectrum. While the concept of best practice 
in spectrum management regime remains controversial, the case of Guatemala is a perfect 
‘experiment’ to discern the effect of policies where the market is afforded a more important 
role in the allocation of frequencies. 
 
When Coase wrote his paper, spectrum scarcity was not a major issue. Nowadays, though, 
spectrum management has become a major policy concern and a topic of increasing interest in 
the economic literature. The extraordinary growth in the use of smartphones and other wireless 
devices and the emergence of new services and applications are increasing traffic demand 
exponentially and consistently spectrum usage.  The Radio-communication Bureau of the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN specialized agency for 
telecommunications in 2007 estimated the need for additional spectrum for mobile broadband 
as between 1,280 and 1,720 MHz by 2020 (ITU, 2007). But the impressive growth of traffic
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meant even these forecasts fell short, and ITU is conducting a new review of to update these 
estimates ahead of a future World Radio Conference, where additional allocations for mobile 
broadband may be made, ITU (2013). 
 
Broadband and its wireless component have been identified as a source of increased growth and 
productivity rates; see World Bank (2009), Czernich et al (2011), Koutroumpis (2009). In 
developing countries, the demand for spectrum to unlock mobile broadband’s potential for 
growth is located in the upper band of the estimates. Wireless access is in many cases the only 
practical and affordable way to expand internet access in developing countries. That’s because 
many developing countries lack legacy fixed networks of copper loops and widespread mobile 
coverage undermines the business case for building new ones, especially in rural and sparsely 
populated areas. 
 
 
Figure 1: Research evidence of broadband impact on GDP growth in different regions 
 
 
 
Source: R. Katz (2010) The impact of broadband on the economy: Research to date and policy issues. 
 
 
The impact of the reform 
 
In 1996 the Guatemalan Government carried out a spectrum policy reform to liberalize the 
allocation of frequencies. Before the reform, spectrum markets were regulated by a State 
Agency for frequencies below 800 MHz, and a State owned company controlled frequencies 
above 800MHz. Mobile telephony was an exception since it was provided by a private company 
that gave a share of its profits to the stated-owned company. The Guatemalan reform was 
followed by a similar reform in El Salvador. 
 
Mobile telephony and wireless broadband can be considered the most successful commercial 
services using the spectrum over the last 20 years1 , consequently the amount of spectrum 
devoted to mobile services in the years since the reform is a good indicator of the ability of a 
spectrum management regime to allocate the bands to the usage that the market gives the 
highest value. 
 
Penetration rates, and retail prices are good indicators of a market’s degree of competition; 
Ibarguren (2003) analyzes the time series of the Guatemalan mobile penetration and the retail 
prices in the years immediately following the reform and compares this data with the time 
 
1 For example a study carried out by Analysys Mason (2012) for the UK, estimates that some 58% of the value of 
radio spectrum in the UK– £30.2 billion -comes from public mobile communications. The second most valuable 
service is broadcasting – £10.8 billion or 21% of total spectrum value.
series of an average of Latin American countries. Penetration grew in Guatemala at an annually 
compounded rate of 71.7% between 1997 and 2001, compared to 46.8% for the Latin American 
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average.  Average retail prices for mobile services in Guatemala were only halve2   the Latin 
American average in 2002. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mobile Penetration (RHS) and ARPU as proxy of retail prices in Guatemala, and Latin 
America, after the reform 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ibarguren (2003) liberating the radio spectrum in Guatemala 
 
 
A higher amount of spectrum allocated to the mobile service is expected to yield increased 
competition, penetration rates, and lower prices. IDRC (2010) analyzes the correlation between 
spectrum allocations and the average price per minute of mobile voice calls, the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index of telephony market concentration and the percentage rate of mobile phone 
penetration for Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. 
 
Figure 3 shows an inverse and significant correlation between the amount of spectrum allocated 
to the mobile service and the price per minute of a mobile call. Countries that carried out 
spectrum liberalization, principally El Salvador and Guatemala, allocated higher amounts of 
spectrum to mobile communications in 2003, and by 2009, both enjoyed lower prices than 
countries where spectrum regimes were not liberalized (Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama), 
though prices declined in all countries sampled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Retail prices were estimated in the study using a proxy, the average revenue per subscription, to avoid problems 
associated with non-linear pricing.
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Concerning market structure and competition, Figure 4 shows a significant correlation between 
the amount of spectrum allocated to the mobile service and lower figures in the HH Index and 
therefore a higher degree of competition in countries with liberalized spectrum markets. It 
should be noted however, that in the case of Costa Rica mobile telephony was supplied by a 
government monopoly until 2011 and this make more difficult to interpret the data. 
 
With regard to the penetration rate Figure 5 exhibits a significant correlation between the 
amount of spectrum for the mobile service and the penetration rate. Except for the case of 
Panama, where the mobile market departed from a regulated monopoly to a competitive market 
in 2003, El Salvador and Guatemala are the countries with higher penetration rates. 
 
 
The relationship between the spectrum reform, increased competition and fall in retail prices 
might be spurious. An analysis controlling for additional variables is needed. Hazlett et al 
(2006) carried out an econometric study of the Guatemalan reform using a dataset3 of 16 Latin 
American countries with annual data between 2000-2004, in order to test if the higher amount 
 
 
3 The study includes the following variables: GDP per Capita, the Fraser Index of Economic freedom, population 
density, fixed line penetration, the percentage of population that live in urban areas and the percentage of GDP 
tied to the mobile service as controlling variables. The study confirms that the reform explains the increased 
spectrum devoted to mobile communications in Guatemala and El Salvador, as the significant correlation cannot 
be explained by other variables, such as GDP per Capita or the Fraser Index, since these two countries are 
associated with relatively lower levels of income and economic freedom.
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of spectrum brought about by the reform was the explanatory variable for increased 
competition and fall in retail prices. They found that liberalization has achieved its policy goals 
in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador. There is a positive relationship between the amount 
of spectrum and the degree of competition and a negative correlation between the amount of 
spectrum and retail prices. 
 
Current situation 
 
Spectrum management policies similar to those of Guatemala, e.g. the use of auctions to 
allocate spectrum, have currently been accomplished by several countries in the region. Some 
of these countries have surpassed the amount of spectrum that Guatemala allocates to the mobile 
service. For example, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Honduras currently exceed 
Guatemala’s figures. 
 
Two reasons might explain why other countries in the region have overtaken Guatemala in 
terms of the availability of spectrum to the mobile service.  First, although the Guatemalan 
spectrum regime enables the use of market mechanisms to allocate spectrum in the so-called 
regulated bands, the procedures to assess the feasibility and effectively change an allocation 
from public to regulated where market demands additional spectrum  have not been addressed 
in the Telecommunications Act. 
 
In April 2015, the Guatemalan spectrum regulator, SIT, transformed the bands 1670-1859 MHz 
and 2110-2290 MHz from frequencies reserved for public usage to regulated bands subject to 
the grant of TUF licenses4. The resolution SIT 265/2015 stated that although the entire suitable 
spectrum available in regulated bands had already been allocated to the mobile service, there 
would not be enough frequencies to meet demand for mobile broadband if additional spectrum 
were not allocated to the mobile service.  However one month later, the resolution SIT-369- 
20155 revoked resolution SIT 265/2015 stating that the transformation of the spectrum use from 
public to regulated shall be suspended under the contentious administrative court provisions. 
 
Secondly, it may be difficult to change the use of spectrum even in regulated bands because of 
the existence of coordination failures in the transaction of TUFs in certain bands. For example, 
the broadcasting of television signals is a public service that requires the grant of TUF licenses. 
Broadcasters are willing to change the technology of emissions from analogue to digital in order 
to either diminish the number of TUFs they need to provide the service or increase the number 
of television channels. Potential spectrum users, such as mobile operators, are also willing to 
participate in the auction of frequencies from the analogue to digital transition in order to meet 
demand for mobile broadband. Also the regulator is keen to facilitate the transition from 
analogue to digital because it would allow a more efficient spectrum usage, increased revenues 
for the regulator and enhanced cultural diversity from the increased number of television 
channels. However, for the transition from analogue to digital television to reap the benefits of 
additional services two elements must exist. There should exist a mechanism to re-organize 
frequencies allocated to the broadcasting service to made available a contiguous spectrum block 
suitable for the provision of mobile broadband and a procedure to sell some TUF’s from 
broadcasters to mobile operators—or other spectrum users—in such a way that both can benefit 
from the transaction. This will not occur without a coordinated process managed by the 
regulator. The Guatemalan regulator has lagged behind in this process with 
 
 
 
4 Resolution 265/2015 available at:  http://www.sit.gob.gt/index.php/2014-05-28-20-40-10/resoluciones 
5 Resolution 369/2015 available at:  http://www.sit.gob.gt/index.php/2014-05-28-20-40-10/resoluciones
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regard to other countries such as Mexico that will finish the transition from analogue to digital 
in December 2015 or the Dominican Republic that will also finish the transition in 2015. 
 
Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
Existing literature support the hypothesis of social welfare gains associated with an increased 
market role in spectrum allocation. The case of Guatemala is an example of how market 
mechanisms for allocation can improve competition and efficiency in spectrum markets. 
 
Although initially liberalization allowed Guatemala to leapfrog its regional peer countries 
regarding the amount of spectrum allocated to the mobile service, increased competition and 
lower prices. Allocations are currently similar or less to those accomplished by other countries 
in the region such as Mexico, Dominican Republic or Honduras that also reformed the spectrum 
management regime. 
 
Once the amount of spectrum identified to be granted with TUF licenses have been exhausted 
in Guatemala, the regulator needs to find a way to re-organize existing allocations. Mechanisms 
to assess the change of use from public to regulated where it is feasible and approaches to 
accelerate the change of use in regulated bands when coordination failures exist would help to 
alleviate tensions in spectrum demand. 
 
The “Big Bang” reform that entails the possibility to lease, resell, or subdivide the spectrum 
and enables the change of service and technology should be balanced with a more gradual 
approach with increasing rights of use  in selected bands. Other possibilities that allow higher 
market participation are also available. The utilization of administered incentive prices , where 
the regulator set administrative fees for the use of spectrum that try to emulate the market price 
of a frequency band in order to  introduce price signals and encourage more efficient usage, 
the use of auctions as an allocation mechanism, the flexible use of spectrum authorizing the 
change of technology and service in a particular frequency band, are complementary solutions 
to the definition of property rights, and the existence of a secondary market for spectrum. The 
best approach for each country and spectrum band should be analyzed on a case by case basis. 
The existence of economies of scale in device manufacturing through global and regional 
spectrum harmonization and the advantage of a more important market role in spectrum 
allocations should be weighted in order to find the most efficient solution for each particular 
band and country. One size fit all policy solutions are not possible in spectrum management 
since the legacy usage of a spectrum band might be different in each country and is a key 
element to determine the cost and benefit of each approach.
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